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Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page14 of 26
Indictment. The District Court therefore correctly denied Maxwell’s
motion without an evidentiary hearing.
2. The Indictment Is Timely
Maxwell argues that Counts Three and Four of the Indictment
are untimely because they do not fall within the scope of offenses
involving the sexual or physical abuse or kidnapping of a minor and
thereby do not fall within the extended statute of limitations provided
by § 3283.19 Separately, Maxwell contends that the Government cannot
apply the 2003 amendment to § 3283 that extended the statute of
limitations to those offenses that were committed before the enactment
into law of the provision. On both points, we disagree and hold that
the District Court correctly denied Maxwell’s motions to dismiss the
charges as untimely. We review de novo the denial of a motion to
dismiss an indictment and the application of a statute of limitations.*°
First, Counts Three and Four of the Indictment are offenses
involving the sexual abuse of minors. The District Court properly
applied Weingarten v. United States.*! In Weingarten, we explained that
Congress intended courts to apply § 3283 using a case-specific
©! 18 U.S.C. § 3283 provides: “[n]o statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude
prosecution for an offense involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child
under the age of 18 years shall preclude such prosecution during the life of the child, or for
ten years after the offense, whichever is longer.”
2° United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270, 276, 278 (2d Cir. 2018).
21 865 F.3d 48, 58-60 (2d Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Maxwell, 534 F. Supp. 3d 299, 313-
14 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).
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Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page15 of 26
approach as opposed to a “categorical approach.”*? We see no reason
to depart from our reasoning in Weingarten. Accordingly, the question
presented here is whether the charged offenses involved the sexual
abuse of a minor for the purposes of § 3283 based on the facts of the
case. Jane, one of the women who testified at trial, gave evidence that
she had been sexually abused when transported across state lines as a
minor. Counts Three and Four thus qualify as offenses, and § 3283
applies to those offenses.
Second, Maxwell argues that Counts Three, Four, and Six of the
Indictment are barred by the statute of limitations because the
extended statute of limitations provided by the 2003 amendment to
§ 3283 does not apply to pre-enactment conduct. In Landgraf v. USI
Film Products, the Supreme Court held that a court, in deciding
whether a statute applies retroactively, must first “determine whether
Congress has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach.” If
Congress has done so, “the inquiry ends, and the court enforces the
2 The “categorical approach” is a method of statutory interpretation that requires courts to
look “only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts
underlying those convictions” for sentencing and immigration purposes. Taylor v. United
States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). We properly reasoned in Weingarten that § 3283 met none of
the conditions listed by Taylor that might require application of the categorical approach.
See Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 58-60. First, “[t]he language of § 3283[] .. . reaches beyond the
offense and its legal elements to the conduct ‘involv[ed]’ in the offense.” Id. at 59-60. Second,
legislative history suggests that Congress intended § 3283 to be applied broadly. Id. at 60.
Third, a case-specific approach would not produce practical difficulties or potential
unfairness. Id.
3511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994); see also Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 54-55.
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Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page16 of 26
statute as it is written.” If the statute “is ambiguous or contains no
express command regarding retroactivity, a reviewing court must
determine whether applying the statute to antecedent conduct would
create presumptively impermissible retroactive effects.”
Here, the inquiry is straightforward. In 2003, Congress
amended § 3283 to provide: “No statute of limitations that would